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	<title>BrainPains</title>
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	<description>A Group Blog in the Philosophy of Mind</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 28 Jan 2011 21:31:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Brain, Mind and Science: The Future of Neuro-ethics</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=203</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=203#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Jan 2011 21:31:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Howell</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Announcements]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=203</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We at Brainpains are excited to announce a one day conference on Neuroethics to be hosted at SMU on February 10, 2011 from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  The focus will be on ways developments in neuroscience can help inform ethical thought and policy.  We are very pleased to have five top philosophers coming to [...]]]></description>
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		<title>More PUB (Phenomenal Unity Blindness)</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=197</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=197#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Nov 2010 05:42:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Philippe Chuard</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=197</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ah well! I&#8217;m also a little confused about another way of thinking of phenomenal unity. In “What is the Unity of Consciousness?”, Tim Bayne and David Chalmers (2003) propose the following characterisation of phenomenal unity at a time: Two conscious mental states m &#38; m* are subsumptively phenomenally unified = there is something it is [...]]]></description>
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		<title>Byrne &amp; Hilbert on Color Physicalism</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=191</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=191#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2010 18:40:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>JFisher</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Color]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Representation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=191</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In our recent meeting, we discussed Alex Byrne &#38; David Hilbert’s (2003) BBS paper, “Color Realism and Color Science”.  The central question in that paper is this:  Q1:  When various objects appear to us as being colored, exactly what are the properties they appear to have? I’m perfectly happy with B&#38;H’s rephrasing this in terms [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>From Personal Identity to Subject-Body Dualism</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=171</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=171#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Nov 2010 21:38:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Robert Howell</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dualism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Materialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personal Identity]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=171</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Brainpains crowd recently read Martine Nida-R�melin's �An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject-Body Dualism,� which appeared recently in The Waning of Materialism (eds. Koons and Bealer). Like many of the articles in that volume, this piece attempts to loosen the grip of the reigning dogma in the philosophy of mind through new arguments that pose problems for a materialistic worldview. Though I resist her conclusion, Nida-R�melin should be applauded for pushing a deep intuition about selves, forcing the materialist to think twice about his commitments.]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
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		<title>Phenomenal Unity/Continuity Blindness</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=165</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=165#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Nov 2010 06:09:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Philippe Chuard</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=165</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[That’s what I seem to be suffering from! Whenever there’s a claim that different experiences are phenomenally unified or continuous (synchronically, diachronically), I get confused. Two related aspects to my confusion. 1) what do such claims amount to? I understand what subject unity might be, and what content unity might be, and what temporal unity [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>4</slash:comments>
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		<title>Extensionalism &amp; Presentism</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=161</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=161#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Oct 2010 05:38:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Philippe Chuard</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=161</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It’s not uncommon to hear that the extensional view of temporal experiences clashes with presentism—indeed both Hoerl and Dainton consider it. The thought seems natural enough. If extensionalism is true, either we have temporally extended experiences representing extended portions of reality (state extensionalism), or unextended experiences with an extended content (content extensionalism). But if presentism [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Perceptual Experience and Particularity</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=157</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=157#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Oct 2010 02:24:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Brad Thompson</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=157</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We recently read Susanna Schellenberg&#8217;s (2010) paper, &#8220;The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience&#8221;. Here Schellenberg develops an account of perceptual experience that accounts for what she calls the &#8220;particularity&#8221; of perceptual experience, while also accommodating the possibility of two experiences being subjectively indistinguishable despite involving perceptual relations to distinct environments (including where one of [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Perceiving succession, duration, &#8230; : what&#8217;s at issue?</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=152</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=152#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2010 04:53:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Philippe Chuard</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=152</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[One of my students is taking an independent study on the perception of time and space and we just read Barry Dainton’s latest Stanford Encyclopedia piece on temporal consciousness. I’m a fan of Dainton’s work, and this is one of the best presentations of the issue I’ve come across. Insofar as the nature of the [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>4</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Tensed Perceptual Contents &amp; Token-Reflexivity</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=140</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=140#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Oct 2010 04:33:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Philippe Chuard</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=140</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In his &#8220;Time &#38; Tense in Experience&#8221; (Phil.Imprint, 2009), Christoph Hoerl maintains that the assumption that the contents of experiences are tensed is operative in the dispute as to whether we perceive temporal relations and how. Another difficulty I have is the way in which Christoph sets up the dispute in his paper, and what [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?feed=rss2&amp;p=140</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Is Constitution Transitive?</title>
		<link>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=135</link>
		<comments>http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=135#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Sep 2010 06:26:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>JFisher</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://brainpains.com/wordpress/?p=135</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Our paper this week was Robert Wilsons (2009) The Transitivity of Material Constitution Nous 43: 363-77.  The central aim of this paper is to clarify understandings of material constitution, and to raise cautionary flags regarding arguments that presume that constitution is transitive.]]></description>
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