Thanks, Justin.

For my part, I don’t think I know of any philosophical discussion that can’t be restated as a merely terminological dispute. So I don’t doubt that the dispute between S&P and A&G can be deflated in that way. A more interesting question is whether there is any way of understanding our disagreement that does not render it merely terminological. I think there is.

BTW, although Larry and I play along in that 2008 JPhil commentary, my official position is that realization is not limited to causal realization. This is a key part of my critique of Carl’s view in my 2007 AJP paper, and it is present in my 2004 book.

Left by Tom Polger on June 18th, 2009

I’m not familiar with Chalmers’ powerpoint slide, but (a) I am suspicious of the idea of “neutral” descriptions, and (b) the proposal looks awfully familiar. If it’s not a verificationist criteria of significance, it’s awfully similar. I guess the “neutral” terminology will be like the observation terms and the non-”neutral” terminology will be like the theoretical terms… and we’re off and running. This will count some disputes as significant and some as “terminological,” and etc.

If this is anything like right, then the next move will be to ask whether the proffered distinction between terminological and non-terminological disputes is, by its own criteria, significant or merely terminological. Well? It looks, to me, as though it will not be a substantial distinction, but merely terminological.

Left by Tom Polger on June 22nd, 2009

Hi Tom,

That’s not how the proposal goes — you might take a look at the link in Justin’s message. But even without doing that, it would be useful to get your perspective on the following challenge: can you state the issue (or perhaps part of the issue) between you and your opponents without using the term “realization”? If you can, that would at least have the potential of clarifying the dispute for those of us who aren’t certain which parts of it are substantial. If you can’t, that at least raises a suspicion that the debate fundamentally rests on a verbal issue about the use of the word “realization”.

Left by David Chalmers on June 22nd, 2009

Hey y’all,

Part of me shares Justin and Dave’s worry about the issue being merely terminological, and I’m curious to read Tom’s response. But part of me also wonders whether a particular point in Justin’s first worry cannot be made without the more sweeping meta-philosophical claim. I’d like to hear Tom speak more directly to that worry.

Suppose it isn’t a mere terminological dispute (if only for the sake of argument; or if, like me, you’re still open to that possibility). Suppose there is some well-defined realization relation R, where all parties involved agree to the characterization of R (clearly that’s not in fact the case, given the issues raised in the second part of Polger and Shapiro’s paper). And then, there is a substantive metaphysical dispute, say, about the relata of R: properties, property-instances, objects, etc.

Now, Gillett is said to define realization as a relation between property-instances. Tom and Shapiro then argue (p. 214) that (a) it follows from Gillett’s definition that “only property instances can be realized on his view”, which in turn (b) rules out multiple realization because “no property instances are multiply realized”.

What I don’t really get is why this (i.e., (a)) is supposed to follow. If realization relates property-instances p and q, why can’t it be the case that realization thereby relates (if only derivatively, perhaps) properties P and Q? After all, many properties and relations of properties can apply both to properties and their instances. Yellow is brighter than blue, but so is an instance of yellow and an instance of blue. Weighing 50 kgs causes one to fall in certain circumstances but so does the particular weight of Sam when he falls down the stairs on Tuesday. Is there any reason why this isn’t true of realization?

It seems that if realization relates properties like P and Q, then it will thereby relate their instances p and q, p’ and q’, etc. Conversely, if one property instance p realizes another property instance q, then the following seems true: (1) if all other instances of Q are realized by other instances of P and only by them, then property P realizes property Q, or (2) if instances s, s’, s’’, … of some other property type S also realize instances of Q, then Q is multiply realized by P or S. I didn’t see anything in Polger and Shapiro’s paper to suggest that Gillett cannot agree with that, or did I miss something?

(This is complete speculation on my part, but I would have thought that there are at least 2 reasons for defining realization in terms of property instances: (i) if realization relates properties and properties can be uninstantiated, then it’s possible for P to realize Q even if the realization relation isn’t in fact instantiated because P and Q have no actual instances, which would fail to satisfy the requirement that realization (or realizers) is concrete and physical, which Polger and Shapiro seem to impose (p. 217); (ii) to say that property P realizes property Q rules out a certain kind of multiple realizability, such that only one instance of P realizes one instance of Q and other instances of Q are realized by instances of other property types. Defining realization in terms of property-instances has at least the merit of avoiding this difficulty and to remain neutral on the issue of multiple realizability.)

—————————————

Since Tom has been kind enough to respond to Justin so promptly, I’d like to abuse his generosity and time a bit more and ask a few follow-up questions—most of which are simply clarificatory:

1) the main issue between the flat and the dimensioned view of realization seems to be this (p. 218): whether realization only relates ‘things’ (properties, property-instances, objects) at the same level (the flat view) or whether it can relate things at different levels, such as an object and its constituting atoms, say (the dimensioned view). The way it is defined, Gillett’s dimension view allows for realization to be both interlevel and intralevel, it seems. Pluralists should like it.

What I don’t get is why the main argument against Gillett’s view focuses on this issue about properties vs property-instances. The two issues seem orthogonal, in that some defenders of the flat view will define realization as a relation between properties whilst others will define it as a relation between property-instances (a possibility they mention in a footnote), and the same is true for defenders of the dimensioned view. Indeed, many participants in the dispute don’t seem to be all that bothered about the property/property-instance distinction—for instance, Shoemaker seems to use both in his new book.

But then, if Polger and Shapiro were right about the problem with defining realization in terms of property instances, one would have thought that the charitable thing to do was to rephrase Gillett’s dimensioned view in terms of properties, and then to criticize this rephrased dimensioned view on behalf of the flat view. So why not do that? I’m a bit unclear about the dialectic and the strategy here.

2) on p. 217, Polger and Shapiro go further and object to defining one of the relata of realization (the realizing one) in terms of properties on the ground that realizers should be real, concrete and physical. They suggest that realizers are objects, not properties. This seems to imply that properties aren’t real, concrete or physical, and that they don’t “do” anything.

They insist that their argument does not rely on any particular theory of properties, but I fail to see how this can be so. Surely, a proponent of Armstrong’s Aristotelian universals is unlikely to be impressed by this piece of reasoning. It seems pretty clear they rely on the assumption that properties are some sort of abstract universal (I thought the comparison with numbers was revealing).

3) Also, I find it a bit difficult to see how the suggestion that realizers are objects combines with the flat view of realization. This seems to imply that the object that instantiates the property is the realizer of the property. But then, what exactly is the difference between realization and instantiation? On the other hand, it seems as though to say that my property of being in pain is realized by some part of my brain C (as they seem to be willing to say) would commit one to the dimensioned view (as much a difference in levels here as In Gillett’s diamond case, it seems). Here, I’m really confused about what’s going on, and what this dispute is really about!

Left by Philippe Chuard on June 23rd, 2009

QUICK (sort of) QUESTION FOR DAVE (sorry for hijacking, but this is interesting!)

(How are you? Congrats for the Attention Conference you’ve put together, looks really terrific!)

I’m very curious but confused about some of these collapse (no substantive dispute) issues. I would tend to agree that if (a) all facts can be re-described neutrally without the problematic terminology at issue, and (b) both sides can agree to the re-description, then (c) any residual dispute is a mere terminological dispute.

The worry is that this seems a bit too narrow (caveat: haven’t read the slides carefully either, and this is really not-very-baked, but here goes).

It seems it could turn out that both sides do disagree about some of the facts stated neutrally, even though the core dispute really is a merely terminological one. It could also turn out, it seems, that the terminology at issue is so broad and wide-spread, forming such a tight complex of inferentially related terms that it’s not really feasible to do (a) and re-describe everything neutrally without losing some of the claims that some of the parties hold dear, thus preventing them from accepting the redescription. Or it could also turn out that what we have is a series of embedded merely terminological disputes—i.e., a complex set of interrelated theoretical terms defined differently by both sides (I sometimes worry the conceptualist vs non-conceptualist dispute in the philosophy of perception is a bit like that–let’s hope not!).

In which case, many merely terminological disputes won’t count as merely terminological (or only very trivially so) on this characterization—at least, we may not be able to use this characterization to tell whether they are, it seems. (perhaps, the first situation isn’t one where there is a merely terminological dispute, since there is some factual dispute too. Even so, the dispute might be essentially terminological. And I would have thought that for meta-philosophical purposes, we should care as much about the latter as we care about the former.)

In any case, I’m tempted by another (rather negative) characterization: dispute D is merely terminological if (1) there is no proposition p such that (2) the meaning of p and/or the constitutive terms in p can be explained neutrally in terms that are common to and unequivocally accepted by both parties involved in D and (3), whereas one party asserts p, the other denies it, and (4) the assertion of p captures the main theoretical commitments of one side whereas the denial of p captures those of the other side.

This seems to avoid some of the problems mentioned above, but are there any reasons to think this is too broad or too narrow? Also, I’m not sure how to think of the relations (if any) between this characterization and yours: any suggestions?

Left by Philippe Chuard on June 23rd, 2009

Philippe: I do think it’s quite possible for these “tight complexes of inferentially related terms” to give rise to an interconnected network of terminological disputes. In fact, I think that happens sometimes in philosophy, and elements of the conceptual/nonconceptual content dispute may be like this. And I think that in these cases the same method applies, in principle — see if one can state an issue at dispute without using any of the terms in that network. I think the main exception to this principle is when the key terms in the network express what I call a “bedrock” concept. But I think it is pretty implausible that the technical term “realization” is such a term.

Philippe: I think you’ve given a sufficient but not necessary condition for a terminological dispute. I think it’s often the case that one can’t explicate the proposition under discussion *precisely* in neutral terminology — that’s just an instance of the familiar absence of perfect conceptual analyses of philosophically interesting expressions. But one can have a verbal dispute involving such expressions all the same. The test I propose doesn’t require anything nearly so strong. That is, the neutrally stated dispute doesn’t have to be a precise explication of the original dispute. Just something relevant at issue that is part of the original dispute.

Justin, Tom: Yes, one can certainly have a verbal dispute about the meaning of “verbal dispute”. The issue between Philippe and I in the paragraph above could potentially be one. But here I am happy to apply the methodology, throw away the term “verbal dispute”, and say: the key issue is whether such-and-such disputes are pointless given background agreement (unless interested in language for its own sake) and whether they are susceptible to purely linguistic resolution.

Anyway, the issue about realization doesn’t require any of this fancy methodological analysis. I’d just like to hear someone take up the challenge and state a central issue under dispute without using the term “realization”!

Left by David Chalmers on June 24th, 2009

Yikes! I guess I should check back more often!

Like everyone else I sometimes suspect that philosophers who appear to be having a dispute are in fact just talking past one another. Despite not having proposal for a principled way of making that distinction, I remain suspicious of Dave’s proposal, at least as it was explained by Justin. (For the record, I said that the “neutral” terms would be “like” observation terms, not that they would be observation terms. That still seems right.) But I don’t need an account of that distinction, so it’s OK that I don’t have one. And I have no trouble with the often useful method of seeing whether one can restate a disagreement without using disputed terminology.

Moreover, I share the concern that the dispute between me and Larry (on the one hand) and Carl sometimes with Ken Aizawa (on the other hand) might turn out to be a case talking past one another, trying to explain different phenomena. That’s what I said in 2004. But then Carl kept arguing that the differences between our views have consequences for issues of common interest, e.g., how ubiquitous multiple realizations (i.e., cross-classifying taxonomies) are, whether psychoneural reduction is plausible, and so. So I argued that his account is wrong ‘cause it gives the wrong answers on stuff like that (e.g., mostly Larry and I have tried to keep the debate focused there. If those debates are substantial, and if different accounts of realization give different answers, then it looks like there’s substantive disagreement.

Of course you might worry that the whole nest of issues are all (jointly) terminological, as Philippe (hello, by the way) seems to worry. One might want to see the whole thing cast in a way that is “neutral” to an outsider, not just “neutral” to the parties concerned. (I’m skeptical about that kind of sub specie aeternitatis neutrality, but leave that aside for now.) It also might be, of course, that some disputes about realization are substantial and some are not.

With that preamble, I’ll take a shot at saying what one of the substantive issues is supposed to be: We all agree that big things are (frequently) made of little things, and that (when that occurs) the properties of big things depend on the properties of the little things of which they are made. How do non-basic entities come to have their properties?

According to Gillett, there is one answer, and it applies to the properties of aggregates, organized composites, constituted entities, and functional entities. Similarly, there is one answer (each) for how particulars, events, and processes at different levels are related. Every property of an upper level entity depends on the properties of its constituents in the same way. (It is “realized.”) For Gillett, this is a tightly interdefined set of basic metaphysical relations.

(As an aside, this is one reason that Larry and I think it was fair to read Carl—uncharitably, some of you may think—as having offered a definition of realization tout court rather than for realization for property instances. (a) He has different relations for each entity type. And, (b) he offers it as a general account of realization defined in terms of relations among property instances. This seemed to suggest that he was not just talking in the sloppy way that most of the realization debate allows, where we did’t really care what the relata are. Until Shoemaker’s subset model, nobody much bothered about the relata, it seems to me.)

Anyhow, back to the difference. According to me, there is more than one answer. Some things get their properties by being composed of parts, some by standing in special relations (“functional relations”) to other things, or by having components that do so, some by being wholly constituted, and maybe others. And, for me, it is an open question whether one or more of these dependence relations can be reduced to one or more of the others.

According to me and Larry, there are consequences to this, as to what resources we have for explaining certain kinds of phenomena. But that’s another story.

Is that a real dispute?

Left by Tom Polger on June 26th, 2009

Hello Tom, how are you? Thanks for posting!

Leaving the question whether or not your disagreement with Gillett is terminological to others, I’d still like to know why you think that if Gillett has specific reasons to define realization as between property instances (and it struck me some such reasons could be quite good), then it can’t also hold between properties on his view. Sorry to insist!

—————————–

Hi Dave, thanks for the earlier comment! Some quick follow-up clarificatory questions:

1) having read the slides more carefully, I realize you don’t really propose to give an account or definition of terminological disputes, only some criterion for determining when a dispute is merely terminological. Is that right? If so, I guess most of my worries simply concerned the practical feasibility of applying such a criterion, especially is the terminological dispute is widespread and really consists in an interconnected network of terminological disagreements. I’d still like to see it done for good, especially if we require both parties to acquiesce to the neutral description on offer: they are philosophers after all.

2) you didn’t address the case where the dispute is essentially terminological but there is some factual disagreement on the side too. Am I right in thinking that, since your criterion is only a heuristic, it can be applied with some flexibility: if it’s clear that side factual disagreements aren’t in any way responsible for a dispute, they can be ignored—one can still ask whether both parties agree on all the essentially relevant factual matters?

3) we may well be having a terminological disagreement about terminological disagreements. I was assuming that they’re always bad, showing a dispute to collapse—as you say, they hinder understanding, in such a way, I take it, that participants in an MT dispute may simply be talking past one another. However, I get the impression that your view leaves room for the possibility that they’re not always bad: could it be that, in some cases, meta-linguistic disagreements involve substantive philosophical disagreements about the meta-linguistic facts, and not just in a way that’s merely sociological, as you suggest, but a more substantive one about which meta-semantic principles to care about, and which sets of facts we would want a theoretical term T to cover, and what work we’d want T to do. Is that right?

4) re-reading the criterion I proposed, I can see how you’d think I meant something like conceptual analysis in clause (2). But I didn’t have any such thing in mind (for the reasons you describe). What if I relaxed the description a bit? Explicating the content of p only requires, say, that both sides can agree roughly about what would have to be the case in some situation c, if p were true in c.

5) you’re right about the difference: your test doesn’t have to capture the original dispute, mine does. I was assuming there would be something fishy if the reconstruction of a dispute in terms of p, where p does capture a substantive dispute, but p has hardly anything to do with what the original dispute seemed to be about. Admittedly, my criterion is trying to do quite a bit more than merely ensuring we don’t have a merely terminological dispute on our hands.

Left by Philippe Chuard on June 29th, 2009

Hi all, sorry to be slow to the party, but we have a new baby, wee Alisdair, and we were off in the deepest English countryside letting him meet my folks. I am also only supposed to be (finally) finishing my book manuscript about reduction and emergence. But I was thinking about these issues in the middle of the night a month or two ago, albeit whilst holding a wriggling baby. I finished two short notes on this stuff, one directly responding to Tom and Larry. So I have a some developed comments to share.

Let me do this in two parts, the rest of this post speaks to some specific issues raised by Tom and Larry’s (or P&S’s) critique. The next, longer post, takes up David’s useful challenge to more neutrally state, and hence better illuminate, some of what is at issue.

As the next post should make clear, I was a little surprised by the P&S critique because I take the primary basis of evaluating the competing views to be their explanatory power with regard to their object phenomena. (Which with respect to my position is how well it does in accommodating the features of certain scientific phenomena). Rather than pursuing that line of assessment, P&S offer what they term an ‘internal’ critique with their little three step argument. So let me briefly say what I think about that. (BTW I contend that the claim that Kim and Shoemaker do not endorse instances is exegetically deeply implausible. I think the reasons for P&S’s strange reading emerge below. But the texts from both Jaegwon and Sydney are pretty explicit. For our purposes, and contra P&S, I do not think there is any distance between my own views, and Kim and Shoemaker’s, on instances and realization. There are some more subtle differences over what instances are, but they don’t affect the issues at hand).

Phillipe has been making points very close to those I want to make. First, we need to be clear that there are many notions of realization used for many projects (see the next post). I use the term ‘causal-mechanist’ or ‘M’ realization to refer to the class of notion used by Kim, Shoemaker and myself. Second, for the writers focused on M-realization the causal theory of properties is a central piece of machinery.

The latter point is important because, as I think Phillipe mentioned, what we consequently have in the causal theory is an ‘immanent’ account of properties to use Armstrong’s terminology. And THAT is important because the causal theory of properties naturally leads one to think that properties exist through their instantiations in the natural world, i.e. through their instances.

So, one is led to accept that properties exist in the natural world through their instances. And now we can see how P&S’s implicit assumption that if one endorses realization between instances one cannot endorse realization between properties leads to their odd exegesis and to some real problems.

On the exegesis: P&S point to Kim and Shoemaker accepting realization between properties and hence, given their assumption that realization between properties precludes realization between instances, they conclude that these writers cannot endorse realization between instances – despite the numerous, explicit claims to the contrary in both writer’s work. So we can see how the odd exegesis arises. (BTW I also endorse realization between properties and the account of multiple realization in the sciences defended by Ken Aizawa and I in a series of papers focuses on the multiple realization, and hence realization, of properties – though of course we take a property P to be multiply realized when one instance of P is realized by instances of properties F1-Fn and another instance of P is realized by instances of properties G1-Gn. That is, the multiple realization of properties arises from the differential realization of their instances).

On the problem: The problem is that if one takes properties to exist through their instances, then far from realization between instances precluding realization between properties the reverse looks likely to be true. That is, if one has realization between instances, and properties exist through their instances, then one can easily accept that realization between instances results in realization between properties. (And Sydney basically, and I think correctly, says some things pretty close to that in his (2007) book).

The result is that defenders of M-realization reject premise (1) of P&S’s argument — they do not accept that only instances are realized, since such realization results in properties being realized, too. The P&S argument thus collapses as an ‘internal’ objection, since those criticized do not accept all the premises leading to the contradiction.

That is my quick rendition of one problem I see with the P&S critique. I also happen to reject premise (3) as well, since I think there are scientific cases where the evidence suggests instances are also multiply realized over time. (In these cases we have the same instances realized by instances of different properties at different times). However, this doesn’t speak to the worry about whether there are any substantive issues in recent debates over ‘realization’. So let me speak to that in a separate post.

Left by carl gillett on June 30th, 2009

I should start by apologizing for such a long post. But the neutral terminology makes things slower. I should also say I do not think there is any such thing as THE concept of realization. (That claim actually drives me a little nuts since it is doing SO much damage in discussions). Hence I also do not think there is any worthwhile project of articulating THE realization relation. Instead, I think that there have been a number of different concepts of ‘realization’ applied to a number of different projects and object phenomena. I think a lot of people are guilty of ignoring these important meta-methodological points and a number of recent ‘critiques’ fail because they use one notion of ‘realization’ to attack someone who uses a different notion – where the same objection does not go through with the writer’s own proprietary notion (or where the critique is not even relevant to the writers actual project). This is almost an epidemic in the mental causation area.

But I am more interested in the project of solving problems than cataloging other people’s views, so like others I offer a notion of ‘realization’ in addressing issues about certain object phenomena. So let me explain the phenomena I am interested in, some of the competing views, and my own view – all without using the ‘r’ word for David, since this discipline does have benefits.

Two caveats: Excuse the infelicities that result in jamming views into the neutral framework. Please also note I discuss relations between property instances throughout, since I favor that framework – but put in properties if you think that works better for any particular view. I hope I draw out the substantive differences which is the goal here.

I am interested in what I term ‘inter-level mechanistic explanations’ in the sciences – these are real explanations offered by working scientists. Examples: The explanation of the powers, properties and processes associated with (i) a diamond, or (ii) an ion channel, using the powers, properties and processes associated with (i*) bonded carbon atoms or (ii*) protein sub-units. I take it the particular explanations are familiar, as is the vast class of similar explanations found all across the special sciences. Putting it neutrally, inter-level mechanistic explanations are built around taking entities (those from (i*) or (ii*)) at lower ‘levels’, using ‘level’ as widely as possible, to ‘make-up’ entities at higher ‘levels’ (such as those in (i) or (ii)). One crucial question is consequently what the concepts of ‘making-up’, to use a neutral term, deployed by scientists in these explanations actually are. We are limiting ourselves to the ‘making-up’ relations posited between property instances (or properties if you prefer), though I also contend other ‘making-up’ relations are also posited between powers, individuals and processes. Obviously, people offer distinct views of these ‘making-up’ relations, too. But let us stick to the case of property instances and their relations.

(Notice that there are OTHER projects for which accounts of ‘realization’ may be used – for example, accommodating psychological entities/predicates or describing the practices/concepts of computational psychology. Obviously, these latter uses of ‘realization’ are to be assessed differently from those offered in the project I am focused on. I am make no comments on how views fare at those projects).

This is a venerable project. One answer in the 50’s and 60’s (and maybe still current in Australia?), was that of the Positivists, and apparently JJC Smart and the early Lewis, which was that such ‘making-up’ is usually identity – i.e. a one-one relation between property instances and properties that are exactly the same.

More recent answers used machinery developed in the philosophy of mind, primarily topic-neutral Ramseyfication and its bastardizations such as the notion of a so-called ‘second order property’ – that is, the property of having a property that plays a certain role. Note that, given the features of topic-neutral Ramseyfication, the pair of properties found with such a second order property must be in the same individual. I admit this view is usually applied to the psychological case, but it also got applied to the general scientific cases I am interested in. In this manifestation, this view again took ‘making-up’ between property instances to be a one-one relation, but very oddly also took the property doing the ‘making-up’ to be qualitatively exactly the same as the ‘made-up’ second order property for both are taken to have the same defining ‘role’ (and hence powers under the most recent versions). In addition, the pair of properties was again taken to be instantiated in the same individual. Despite being qualitatively exactly the same, the view takes the ‘made-up’ and ‘making-up’ properties to be distinct. Why? Because they have different modal features – for it is claimed still other properties could have ‘made-up’ the relevant special science property, hence violating Leibniz’s Law.

I take the Flat view to be VERY closely related to the previous view, but the Flat view dispenses with the explicit notion of a second order property. Instead, we have a higher level and a lower level property instance where the ‘making-up’ between the property instances is again a one-one relation, and its assumes the ‘made-up’ and ‘making-up’ instances have the same ‘role’ but now explicitly understood as the same contributions of powers. And unsurprisingly the Flat view takes the properties to be instantiated in the same individual. Under Kim’s early formulations, the powers are exactly the same – hence we also have instances that are exactly qualitatively the same. However, a new wrinkle is views that take the powers of the ‘making-up’ property instance to include, but go beyond, those of the ‘made-up’ property instance. Thus we get Shoemaker’s early ‘subset’ version of the Flat view where we only have qualitative similarity, through overlap of powers. Though the pair of instances is still in a one-one ‘making-up’ relation and instantiated in the same individual. (I assume Larry Shapiro to have implicitly endorsed one or other version of the Flat view as his view of ‘making-up’ relations posited between instances and/or properties in the sciences).

Last, take my Dimensioned view of the ‘making-up’ relations posited between property instances in such explanations. I allow relations of the kind posited by Kim and Shoemaker, but point out that there are other kinds of ‘making-up’ between instances, too – especially in cases like (i) and (ii) above. (As Phillipe rightly notes, and no one else bothers to respect, my account covers thus all the cases of the Flat view, but covers the further cases, too). I claim in such cases we find one-many relations, i.e. with many ‘making-up’ instances and one ‘made-up’ instance, holding between instances instantiated in distinct individuals and which are completely qualitatively distinct – i.e. instances that contribute no powers in common.

So, there are at least (let me count) five views of the ‘making-up’ relations posited in inter-level mechanistic explanations in the sciences. Are the issues between them terminological?

Notice that Justin’s earlier claim is now shown to be too crude a criterion for judging sameness. Just because the views each posits a determination relation in all the same places does not leave them making the very same claims – for the details of the kind of determination, and its features, they each posit is obviously central. And we see that the features of the relations posited by the views differ when we are careful to lay them out — I have just noted some of the key features in which they diverge, though there are others as well (one-one vs many-one, exact qualitative identity vs mere simialrlty vs qualitaitive distinctness, and so on).

Of course, we can now go and examine real, concrete cases of inter-level mechanistic explanations and see which views do best at explicating their features – where this includes ontological features of the posited ‘making-up’ relations themselves, and also wider features such as the methodological practices underpinned by these ‘making-up’ relations. That is the critical project I take to be interesting. With regard to this project of assessing how the views fares, I have argued the identity theories clearly fail to be adequate to the features of ‘making-up’ relations we find in the cases (JPhil 2007); the versions of the Flat view fails too (Analysis 2001 for Kim/Shoemaker, and Mind&Language 2009 for Shapiro); and the second order property style positions also fail (Journal of Phil Research 2007 and a forthcoming paper in an anthology entitled FUNCTIONS edited by Hunneman). In various of these papers, I have pressed the virtues of my own view 

But all of that is beside the point, since you don’t have to accept my critique of other views, or defense of my own position, in order for me to make the point that there are real substantive differences in these debates. And note that all of the views have used the term ‘realization’. (The Lewis-style defenses of identities often use a proprietary notion of ‘realization’ even though the Positivists never used the term).

I hope that illuminates some of the ‘first order’ issues. But note that each of these frameworks has also subsequently been used in still wider debates. Having parsed the structure that the sciences reveal in nature, the frameworks are then used to formulate versions of Physicalism, structure discussions of ‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’, discuss ‘multiple realization’, frame the issues about the mind-body relation and mental causation, and more. The differences between the resulting formulations are also not merely terminological given the differences between the underlying views of the ‘making-up’ relation they use.

OK, I hope that was fairly clear, though apologies for mistakes since I wrote this fast and late at night. Are these issues substantive or merely terminological?

Left by carl gillett on June 30th, 2009