In a previous post I questioned whether or not Categorical Phenomenalism—the view that phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of the dispositional properties studied by the physical sciences—is an “according to Hoyle” physicalist position.  In this post I want to raise a related worry: that Categorical Phenomenalism in the end is committed to epiphenomenalism.  For several reasons, I am less convinced that this is a problem (and I hope it is not, for it threatens views of mine as well) but it is worth getting on the table.

Categorical Phenomenalism is motivated in part by the fact that physical science does not describe anything but dispositional properties—the categorical bases of these properties are left out.  There must, however, be such bases—dispositions cannot be “ungrounded.”  Perhaps, then, phenomenal properties provide these categorical bases.

Whether or not you call these bases “physical,” it seems likely that our confidence in the causal closure of the physical stems from our confidence in the causal closure of the physically describable.  If we accept the causal closure of the physically describable, however, then it seems that we have an exclusion argument that shows that the phenomenal bases of categorical properties, which Categorical Phenomenalism admits go undescribed by physics, are epiphenomenal. 

Put crudely, suppose a blue quale B grounds the dispositions D associated with having positive charge.  Does the blueness explain the behavior of the thing that has D?  Isn’t all we need to explain the behavior of things with B the dispositions associated with D?  It seems that nothing about the behavior of things would change if red quale R provided the metaphysical grounds for D instead of B.  Much more needs to be said about the “grounding” relation B holds to D, but at least on the face of it it seems as though God could have the categorical bases of things change constantly, from blue, to yellow, to red, with no change in the causal fabric of the world.  This sounds like epiphenomenalism.  Any thoughts?

4 Responses to “Categorical (Epi?)Phenomenalism”

Hi Professor Howell:
If you begin with the premise of categorical phenomenalism and you stipulate that the dispositional side of things is all that is needed for causality, then epiphenomenalism seems to clearly follow. However, the thesis that physical facts and laws as we understand them are sufficient to ground real causality (as opposed to regularity) is controversial, and there seems plenty of wiggle room to develop a model where categorical properties play a necessary role in micro-level causal connections.

Best regards, - Steve Esser

Hi Steve,
There are several different worries that you might have. We might just disagree, in that I take the aspiration of physical science (or science in general) to indicate–with the laws–the features of the world in virtue of which things happen as they do. I am not inclined to say that the laws ground causality, but that they are true in virtue of the causal powers possessed by the properties mentioned in the laws. If the laws do not mention categorical properties, though, it seems that either those properties are epiphenomenal or science has not lived up to its expectations.

Now it is, perhaps, worth mentioning a possible response to my worry. Namely, if my argument succeeds, it proves too much. It doesn’t trade off of anything particular to categorical phenomenalism–it works against any view that admits the existence of categorical properties. But surely it can’t be the case that categorical properties are epiphenomenal by their very nature, so something has gone wrong.

Hmmm. I think there are several things to say about this, but I’ll shut up for now.
R

Hi Robert,

I’ve enjoyed your posts on Stoljar. Regarding the current post:

I’d say that if X is prone to undetectable dancing then X is epiphenomenal. So, if Stoljar-style categorical bases are conceptually compatible with a dancing qualia thought experiment whereby the bases go flippy-flop without being detectable even in principle, then they are epiphenomenal. If this undermines other accounts of categorical bases, my inclination is not to say that the dancing qualia argument proves too much. I’d say instead, “too bad for those other accounts of categorical bases.”

A thought to add, connected to Robert’s post, and what Pete already said…

Seems to me that position which accepts that
a)knowledge and belief can be described and defined fully in terms of dispositional properties of the things, while
b) assuming that phenomenal properties are connected with the categorical base of those dispositions
will have problems answering how is knowledge or having beliefs about the phenomenal properties possible.

The most easy way out of the problem I see, would be to give up (a), and say that the things like belief, knowledge, and other intentional acts towards phenomenal content are also in the “realm” of the categorical base, and that their full explanation is not fully possible in terms of dispositional properties of the matter. But, would the categorical phenomenalists want to go so far?

Something to say?