In a previous post I questioned whether or not Categorical Phenomenalism—the view that phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of the dispositional properties studied by the physical sciences—is an “according to Hoyle” physicalist position. In this post I want to raise a related worry: that Categorical Phenomenalism in the end is committed to epiphenomenalism. For several reasons, I am less convinced that this is a problem (and I hope it is not, for it threatens views of mine as well) but it is worth getting on the table.
Categorical Phenomenalism is motivated in part by the fact that physical science does not describe anything but dispositional properties—the categorical bases of these properties are left out. There must, however, be such bases—dispositions cannot be “ungrounded.” Perhaps, then, phenomenal properties provide these categorical bases.
Whether or not you call these bases “physical,” it seems likely that our confidence in the causal closure of the physical stems from our confidence in the causal closure of the physically describable. If we accept the causal closure of the physically describable, however, then it seems that we have an exclusion argument that shows that the phenomenal bases of categorical properties, which Categorical Phenomenalism admits go undescribed by physics, are epiphenomenal.
Put crudely, suppose a blue quale B grounds the dispositions D associated with having positive charge. Does the blueness explain the behavior of the thing that has D? Isn’t all we need to explain the behavior of things with B the dispositions associated with D? It seems that nothing about the behavior of things would change if red quale R provided the metaphysical grounds for D instead of B. Much more needs to be said about the “grounding” relation B holds to D, but at least on the face of it it seems as though God could have the categorical bases of things change constantly, from blue, to yellow, to red, with no change in the causal fabric of the world. This sounds like epiphenomenalism. Any thoughts?
Hi Professor Howell:
If you begin with the premise of categorical phenomenalism and you stipulate that the dispositional side of things is all that is needed for causality, then epiphenomenalism seems to clearly follow. However, the thesis that physical facts and laws as we understand them are sufficient to ground real causality (as opposed to regularity) is controversial, and there seems plenty of wiggle room to develop a model where categorical properties play a necessary role in micro-level causal connections.
Best regards, - Steve Esser
Left by Steve Esser on December 1st, 2006